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Limiting State Flexibility in Drug Pricing
Nicholas Bagley, J.D., and Rachel E. Sachs, J.D., M.P.H. 
Throughout the United States, escalating drug prices are put-
ting immense pressure on state 
budgets. Several states are look-
ing for ways to push back. Last 
year, Massachusetts asked the 
Trump administration for a waiver 
that would, among other things, 
allow its Medicaid program to 
decline to cover costly drugs for 
which there is limited or inade-
quate evidence of clinical effi-
cacy.1 By credibly threatening to 
exclude such drugs from cover-
age, Massachusetts hoped to ex-
tract price concessions and con-
strain the fastest-growing part of 
its Medicaid budget.
In late June, however, the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) denied Massachu-
setts’ request.2 On the same day, 
the agency issued a memorandum 
clarifying that, under requirements 
included in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, state 
Medicaid programs are legally 
obliged to cover all drugs ap-
proved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) — includ-
ing those approved under the 
agency’s less rigorous accelerated-
approval pathway.3
Many of these drugs — in-
cluding some with uncertain ef-
ficacy — are very expensive. 
Take, for example, Exondys 51 
(eteplirsen), which was approved 
for the treatment of Duchenne’s 
muscular dystrophy on the basis 
of a trial that involved 12 boys 
and used a surrogate end point. 
The drug’s label states that “a 
clinical benefit of Exondys 51 
has not been established,” yet the 
retail price of the drug is about 
$300,000 per year. State Medic-
aid programs don’t pay full price 
— that same 1990 legislation en-
titles them to a discount that to-
day amounts to at least 23% of 
the drug’s average sales price. 
Even so, drugs like Exondys 51 
are straining state budgets.
To reduce the burden of high-
cost, low-value drugs, Massachu-
setts has proposed establishing a 
closed formulary, in which certain 
drugs can be excluded from cov-
erage. The Trump administration 
might have been expected to 
welcome the proposal. At least 
rhetorically, it is committed to 
reducing drug prices. And closed 
formularies are ubiquitous in pri-
vate insurance and public health 
care programs alike. The Veterans 
Health Administration uses one, 
and Medicare Part D plans can 
exclude certain products.
So why not let Massachusetts 
try a closed formulary for Medic-
aid? CMS’s letter to the state 
doesn’t say. It is silent on what 
exactly is deficient about Massa-
chusetts’ request. The letter does 
claim that CMS “would be will-
ing to consider” a closed formu-
lary — but only if Massachusetts 
both gives up the steep discounts 
that it’s entitled to by law and 
demonstrates that its Medicaid 
spending won’t increase because 
of the changes.
Together, these requirements 
create an insuperable obstacle to 
any closed formulary. Under CMS’s 
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proposed terms, Massachusetts 
would be required to bargain 
with manufacturers for every cov-
ered drug, without the existing 
price discounts guaranteed by 
law. That isn’t practical. No state 
would surrender the automatic 
discounts that it gets on all drugs 
just so it can drive a harder bar-
gain over the few FDA-approved 
drugs that it might exclude from 
coverage. Furthermore, state Med-
icaid agencies work under tight 
budget constraints, and they lack 
the resources and personnel to 
conduct individual negotiations 
for every covered drug.
Requiring states to demonstrate 
budget neutrality exacerbates the 
problem. It is difficult to see how 
a state could negotiate substan-
tial enough discounts on individ-
ual drugs to make up for the loss 
of mandatory price discounts. 
Any state desperate enough to try 
would probably have to place sub-
stantial restrictions on access to 
clearly effective drugs,4 which 
would be unacceptable in a safety-
net program. CMS’s proposed 
alternative might also undo pa-
tients’ legal entitlement to needed 
drugs, thus depriving them of 
their ability to sue states over any 
access restrictions.
In any event, it is not suffi-
cient for CMS to describe a waiv-
er that it would approve; it must 
explain why it rejected the waiver 
that Massachusetts requested. For 
example, the agency could have 
said — but didn’t — that the 
waiver is bad policy. It could have 
said — but didn’t — that the 
waiver contravenes the purposes 
of the Medicaid statute. It could 
have said — but didn’t — that 
the agency lacks the resources to 
oversee a novel waiver like this 
one. CMS offered no explanation 
at all for the rejection. It didn’t 
even say why its proposed alter-
native is superior to what Massa-
chusetts requested.
From a legal perspective, that’s 
a problem. Administrative law re-
quires agencies to provide rea-
sons for their actions. Judges will 
usually defer to those reasons, 
but an unexplained action won’t 
stand up in court. If Massachu-
setts sues, the agency’s decision 
is at least as vulnerable as other 
actions that judges have recently 
invalidated, including CMS’s ap-
proval of Kentucky’s Medicaid 
work requirement. Indeed, CMS’s 
willingness to push the legal en-
velope on work requirements 
stands in stark contrast to its 
timidity when it comes to Massa-
chusetts’ request to experiment 
with a closed formulary.
In recent public statements, 
officials from the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) 
have suggested new explanations 
for the decision to deny Massa-
chusetts’ request. CMS Adminis-
trator Seema Verma asserted that 
the request was not legally per-
mitted but did not explain why. 
HHS Secretary Alex Azar argued 
in the New York Times that Massa-
chusetts’ attempt to exclude some 
drugs from coverage while re-
taining the mandatory discounts 
“render[ed] the proposal an at-
tempt at double-dipping.”
These after-the-fact justifica-
tions track an argument that the 
pharmaceutical industry pressed in 
its campaign against the Massa-
chusetts waiver. In its view, the 
establishment of a closed formu-
lary would violate a “grand bar-
gain” it struck with Congress as 
part of the 1990 legislation.5 
The industry’s view of that bar-
gain is that it agreed to sell 
drugs to Medicaid programs at 
a discount, and, in exchange, 
states would have to cover every 
FDA-approved drug.
Azar and Verma appear to be-
lieve that departing from the law’s 
purportedly neutral baseline would 
be unlawful, unfair, or both. But 
no part of the 1990 law limits 
CMS’s waiver authority over the 
portion of the Medicaid statute 
that governs prescription drugs. 
That’s an important omission. 
Congress knows how to restrict 
the scope of waivers when it 
wants to; indeed, it has done so 
in other parts of the Medicaid 
statute (for example, under the 
section covering cost-sharing re-
quirements). For its part, CMS re-
cently granted Oklahoma’s request 
to waive a different part of the 
same statutory provision that 
Massachusetts now seeks to waive, 
suggesting that the agency’s legal 
objections are a pretext.
What’s more, the grand bar-
gain has already been violated — 
but not by Massachusetts. Since 
1990, changes in pricing strate-
gies, the proliferation of orphan 
drugs and complex biologics, and 
the decreasing rigor of the FDA 
approval process have placed an 
enormous strain on state Medic-
aid budgets. Massachusetts’ re-
quest reflects a thoughtful effort 
to restore the balance established 
by that bargain in light of an 
evolving pharmaceutical market. 
In rejecting the request, the Trump 
administration appears to have 
sided with the drug industry over 
the states.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available at NEJM.org.
From the University of Michigan Law 
School, Ann Arbor (N.B.); and Washington 
University Law School, St. Louis (R.E.S.). 
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